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Introduction 
On March 27, 1995, Sister Joanne Marie Mascha, a member of the 
Ursuline Sisters of Cleveland, Ohio, was raped and murdered in the 
woods of the Ursulines’ property.1 She was discovered in the woods a 
day later under a quilted mattress pad;2 she had been strangled and 
suffocated with a scarf.3 Although one of their own had endured such a  
1. Jennifer A. Webb, Jury Spares Murderer Guilty of Nun’s Death, Cath. 
Universe Bull., Sept. 22, 1995, at 1. 
2. Id. 
3. Barbara Cervenka, The Night Joanne Died, Mich. Today, Mar. 10, 1996, 
at 10; see also Webb, supra note 1 (“[The murderer] claimed [Sister 
Joanne Marie] accidentally suffocated when he stuffed her scarf into her 
mouth.”). 
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brutal murder, the other Ursuline Sisters immediately requested that 
the then-twenty-one-year-old man4 charged with the crime be spared 
the death penalty.5 Sister Joanne Marie was passionate about helping 
those in need, and she demonstrated her passion through the life she 
lived. During the holidays, she bought toys and gave them to children 
of prisoners.6 She also advocated to ban nuclear weapons and 
encouraged Congress to “make hunger a political priority.”7 In the 
words of Sister Maureen McCarthy, General Superior of the Ursuline 
Sisters: “Isn’t it ironic to think that this woman of justice, this woman 
of peace would experience death through violence?”8 Sister Joanne 
Marie was a peace lover, a nature lover, and a lover of birdwatching—
which she was originally doing the day she encountered her killer in the 
woods.9 
That March 1995 encounter was not the first between Sister Joanne 
Marie and Daniel Pitcher.10 The extent of their relationship, however, 
was not entirely clear. Some accounts claimed that “[Pitcher] was 
obsessed with her,” waiting for her in the parking lot of the Ursulines’ 
property;11 whereas Pitcher testified that he had met her only once 
before March 27.12 Sister Joanne Marie confirmed that she had met this 
man approximately a year and a half before her death.13 While going 
through Sister Joanne Marie’s possessions, searching for proof of a 
connection with Pitcher, Sister Joanne Gross, a member of the Ursuline 
Sisters and an attorney, found a paper in which Sister Joanne Marie 
documented an encounter with “a troubled young man searching for 
peace in the quiet of our forest.”14 According to the paper, Sister Joanne 
Marie hoped that, as she left the woods after her encounter with Pitcher 
 
4. Original court documents stating that Daniel Pitcher was twenty-four 
years old at the time of the murder were inaccurate and later corrected 
to reflect that he was twenty-one years old. See Ken Baka, Pitcher Gets 
the Maximum, Sun Press, Sept. 14, 1995 (“Pitcher is not 24, as was 
previously reported and which was based on court documents.”). 
5. Webb, supra note 1. 
6. Friends Seek Meaning as They Bury Slain Nun, Plain Dealer (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Friends Seek Meaning]. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Baka, supra note 4. 
11. Id. 
12. Joanne Gross, The Deliberations of Mortals and the Grace of God, 27 
Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1159, 1162 (1996). 
13. Id. at 1160. 
14. Id. 
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that day, he could hear her sing her prayer for him: “May the blessing 
of God be upon you. May God’s peace be with you. May God’s presence 
illuminate your heart, now and forevermore.”15 When it came time for 
trial, the Ursuline Sisters made their stance known to the prosecutors 
and to the world: they did not want the death penalty for Daniel 
Pitcher16 and they believed that Sister Joanne Marie would never have 
wanted it as well.17 The Sisters were not the only ones who tried to 
sway the minds of the prosecutors, though. Support for their position 
poured into the prosecutors’ offices and the judge’s chambers from 
religious congregations around the world.18 
Despite those pleas to the contrary, the prosecutors still sought the 
death penalty for Daniel Pitcher.19 The reasoning behind the 
prosecutors’ decision varied. Cuyahoga County Assistant Prosecutor 
Karl Wetzel said about the decision: “With any case, the victim, or the 
victim’s family, their intentions come into play, but there are other 
factors . . . [including] the type of crime, strength of the case, and the 
defendant’s history.”20 During a meeting between the prosecutors and 
a few of the Ursuline Sisters, though, the reasoning seemed slightly 
different. According to Sister Joanne Gross, “The prosecutors were 
polite and sympathetic but ultimately, unmoved.”21 After the Ursuline 
Sisters tried to change the prosecutors’ minds at the meeting, the 
prosecutors gave the Ursuline Sisters “an article about death penalty 
politics and how prosecutors across the country are being elected and 
rejected based on their stance on capital punishment.”22 
Daniel Pitcher was found guilty of aggravated murder, aggravated 
robbery, kidnapping, and rape.23 In a turn of events that was described 
by the judge as “pray[ing] this man out of the electric chair,” the jury 
failed to attach the felony-murder specification form to their aggravated 
murder verdict when determining Pitcher’s fate, which meant that he  
15. Id. 
16. Webb, supra note 1. 
17. See Gross, supra note 12, at 1161 (“[General Superior Maureen McCarthy] 
and [Social Justice Coordinator Beverly LoGrasso] talked [to the 
prosecutors] about Joanne Marie’s life, her commitment to nonviolence, 
and how the killing of this man would be against everything she ever stood 
for.”). 
18. Id. at 1162. 
19. Eleanor Mallet, Sisters Remember One of Their Own, Plain Dealer, 
Mar. 5, 1996. 
20. U.B. Staff and Wire Reports, Ursuline Community Won’t Support Death 
Penalty for Nun’s Accused Killer (on file with author). 
21. Gross, supra note 12, at 1161. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1162–63. 
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was no longer eligible to receive the death penalty.24 It was said that 
the jury misunderstood the form and believed that their aggravated 
murder verdict alone would allow Pitcher to get the death penalty.25 
Daniel Pitcher was sentenced to “fifty years to life, the maximum 
sentence on each count, to be served consecutively.”26 
Although the Sisters’ intervention may have helped save Pitcher 
from the criminal justice system’s ultimate punishment, their 
statements’ effect is the exception, not the rule. This Note explores the 
role victims’ statements play, generally, in death penalty cases. Part I 
of this Note will outline the historical treatment of the death penalty 
as the ultimate punishment by the Supreme Court and will explore the 
justifications for the Court’s continual limitations imposed on the 
penalty. 
Part II will examine the relationship between the movement for 
increasing victim’s roles in the criminal justice system and the evolution 
of admissibility of a Victim Impact Statement (“VIS”) in capital cases 
leading up to the current ruling in Bosse v. Oklahoma.27 
Part III will examine the issues left by the Court in refusing to 
reconsider part of the holding in Booth v. Maryland28 when deciding 
Bosse. This will include questioning the constitutionality of VISs’ 
admissibility, examining the current rule in light of the Court’s historic 
treatment of death as “different,” and will discuss the motivations of 
prosecutors in seeking the death penalty in contrast to the interests of 
the State. 
Finally, Part IV will propose a new asymmetrical rule regarding the 
admissibility of VISs in capital cases, allowing the opinions of a victim’s 
family who opposes the death penalty to be heard and taken into 
account by juries during the sentencing phase, and will address 
criticisms of the proposed rule. 
I. Death vs. “Everything Else” 
Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has taken significant 
steps to limit the use of the death penalty in the United States. The 
first of these steps came from the Court’s decision in Furman v. 
Georgia.29 In Furman, the Court determined that each of the capital 
punishment statutes at issue violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth  
24. Id. at 1163–64; see also Webb, supra note 1 (“In a sense, it is a procedural 
error. [The jurors] really didn’t do what they had intended to do.”). 
25. Gross, supra note 12, at 1163. 
26. Id. at 1164. 
27. 137 S. Ct. 1 (2016). 
28. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
29. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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Amendments by allowing the juries full discretion in imposing the death 
penalty, which in turn led to the possibility of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.30 As put by Justice Douglas: “Under these 
laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or 
die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.”31 Although the Court 
did not find the death penalty to be unconstitutional per se, the holding 
in Furman effectively abolished the death penalty across the country, 
as its decision nullified the capital punishment laws of thirty-nine states 
(and the District of Columbia) out of the forty that allowed the death 
penalty at that time.32 
The Furman decision was by no means a united one: all nine of the 
Justices wrote separate opinions.33 Throughout the individual opinions, 
though, many of the Justices reiterated a common idea: death is 
different. As stated by Justice Stewart, 
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal 
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total 
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the 
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, 
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our 
concept of humanity.34 
This rationale gives an idea of why the Court has continued to limit 
the applicability of the death penalty. After Furman was decided, states 
reformed their capital punishment statutes to eliminate any 
unconstitutionally arbitrary application, thus “reinstating” the death 
penalty that had been effectively eliminated.35 The Supreme Court 
clarified the constitutionally permissible ways of imposing the death 
 
30. Id. at 256–57, 305–06, 310, 314, 371 (Douglas, J., Brennan, J., Stewart, 
J., White, J., Marshall J., each concurring separately); Sheherezade C. 
Malik & D. Paul Holdsworth, A Survey of the History of the Death Penalty 
in the United States, 49 U. Rich. L. Rev. 693, 702–03 (2015). 
31. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). The lone remaining state was Rhode 
Island, whose capital statute was mandatory for murder by a life term 
prisoner. Id. The question of the constitutionality of mandatory capital 
punishment statutes remained undecided. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
33. Id. at 240. 
34. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 291 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“In comparison to all other punishments today . . . the 
deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading 
to human dignity.”); id. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The 
question . . . is whether capital punishment is ‘a punishment no longer 
consistent with our own self-respect.’”) (citation omitted). 
35. Malik & Holdsworth, supra note 30, at 703. 
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penalty in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia36 and Woodson v. North Carolina.37 
After Georgia’s death penalty statute was found unconstitutional in 
Furman, Georgia amended its statute to no longer allow arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty but narrowed the class of murderers 
eligible for the death penalty by requiring the jury to find one of ten 
statutory aggravating circumstances to exist beyond a reasonable doubt 
before a death sentence could be imposed.38 The Court upheld the new 
statute, stating that with these revisions, “[n]o longer should there be 
‘no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death 
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’”39 
After the Furman decision, and with the issue of the 
constitutionality of a mandatory capital punishment statute still 
undecided,40 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute 
that remained essentially the same as the previous death penalty 
statute held unconstitutional by Furman. The North Carolina statute 
severed the jury’s discretionary authority to apply the death penalty 
and instead made the death penalty mandatory for all first-degree 
murder convictions.41 The Supreme Court held that statute 
unconstitutional for a number of reasons.42 The first reason was that 
the mandatory statute “depart[ed] markedly from contemporary 
standards respecting the imposition of the punishment of death and 
thus [could not] be applied consistently with the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ requirement that the State’s power to punish ‘be 
exercised within the limits of civilized standards.’”43 The Court pointed 
to the facts that “mandatory death penalty statutes had been 
renounced by American juries and legislatures”44 and that even those 
states that retained the death penalty after Furman did so in a way 
that was “consistent with the Constitution, rather than a renewed 
societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing.”45  
The Court’s second rationale for holding the statute 
unconstitutional was “[the statute’s] failure to provide a 
constitutionally tolerable response to Furman’s rejection of unbridled  
36. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
37. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–97 (plurality opinion). 
39. Id. at 198 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)). 
40. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
41. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285–86. 
42. Id. at 305 (citation omitted). 
43. Id. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality 
opinion)). 
44. Id. at 298. 
45. Id. 
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jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences.”46 Although the 
Furman Court made it clear that the decision did not hold mandatory 
death penalty statutes unconstitutional,47 the Court in Woodson 
explicitly did so. Woodson stated that since the North Carolina 
mandatory death penalty statute provided “no standards to guide the 
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-
degree murderers shall live and which shall die,”48 the statute was 
inconsistent with the holding of Furman because it did “not fulfill 
Furman’s basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury 
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make 
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.”49  
The Court identified a third reason to hold the statute 
unconstitutional by reiterating the themes that were held by the 
Justices in Furman: death is different. “In Furman, members of the 
Court acknowledge what cannot fairly be denied—that death is a 
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than 
degree.”50 The Court reasoned that a statute that did not allow for the 
consideration of each defendant’s character and record before imposing 
the death penalty “treats all persons convicted of a designated offense 
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, 
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
penalty of death.”51 
Two years after Woodson was decided, the Court returned to the 
issue of individualized considerations in capital sentencing in Lockett v. 
Ohio52 to determine what mitigating circumstances the sentencing 
authority must be allowed to consider when deciding whether or not to 
impose the death penalty. Ohio’s death penalty statute required that 
once a guilty verdict of aggravated murder was returned, the trial judge 
was obligated to impose the death penalty unless he found that one of 
three statutory mitigating circumstances was present.53 After 
 
46. Id. at 302. 
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
48. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 303–04 (first citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–91 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); and then citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
51. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
52. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
53. Id. at 593–94. The statute required a death sentence unless, after 
“considering the nature and circumstances of the offense” and the 
defendant’s “history, character, or condition,” the trial judge found 
beyond a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) the victim had induced 
or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that [the defendant] would 
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consideration, the trial judge said that he “had ‘no alternative, whether 
[he] like[d] the law or not’ but to impose the death penalty.”54 The 
Court determined that “given that the imposition of death by public 
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties,”55 an 
individualized determination is essential in capital cases, and that 
during that determination, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
“require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.”56 
The death penalty’s profound difference from other punishments 
has additional Eighth Amendment implications. The Court has held 
that the Eighth Amendment precludes sentencers from imposing the 
death penalty on either those who are mentally retarded57 or those who 
were under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes.58 One 
justification for the Court’s consistent limitations on the scope of the 
death penalty is the theme repeated since Furman: death truly is 
different. 
II. Evolution of the VIS 
The original idea behind our criminal justice system was that the 
State, acting on behalf of the victim of a crime, would fairly measure 
and impose punishment on the accused, in order to avoid any unfair 
retribution based on revenge.59 Beginning in the early 1970s, however, 
advocates began to campaign for increased roles for victims in the 
criminal justice system.60 One way victims’ rights were advocated was 
through the use of VISs, which are accounts by the victim or victim’s 
 
have committed the offense but for the fact that she ‘was under duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation,’ or (3) the offense was ‘primarily the 
product of [the defendant’s] psychosis or mental deficiency.’” Id. at 593–
94 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2929.03–2929.04(B) (LexisNexis 
1975)). 
54. Id. at 594 (citation omitted). 
55. Id. at 605. 
56. Id. at 604. 
57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
58. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
59. Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and 
Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 
143, 143 (1999). 
60. Id. at 144. 
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family61 of the physical, psychological, and financial harm caused by the 
accused’s actions.62 For most of the 1980s, the majority of states allowed 
VISs to be introduced at sentencing.63 
That changed, however, in 1987, when the Supreme Court held that 
the introduction of a VIS at the sentencing phase of a capital murder 
trial violated the Eighth Amendment.64 In Booth v. Maryland,65 both of 
the accused were found guilty of the first-degree murders of Irvin 
Bronstein, age seventy-eight, and his wife Rose, age seventy-five, along 
with two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.66 
Maryland’s statute at the time required that in all felony cases a VIS 
had to be included to be read to the jury at sentencing.67 The VIS 
introduced at sentencing in Booth was based on the Bronsteins’ family’s 
comments on how much the Bronsteins would be missed and the 
emotional problems the family faced as a result of the crime.68 The 
family went on to detail how the deaths had ruined a family wedding, 
 
61. “Victim’s family” is used throughout this Note to represent those to whom 
victims’ rights are extended through applicable state law; that extension 
beyond the victim’s family—or a limitation to only the victim’s family—
is not uniform. For examples of states that have both the death penalty 
and state laws extending victim’s rights, see Ala. Code § 15-23-60 
(1975), Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4401 (2012), Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
90-1101 (West 2017), Cal. Penal Code § 679.02 (West 2012), Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 24-4.1-302 (2017), Fla. Stat. Ann. Const. art. 1 § 16 
(West 1968), Ga. Code Ann. § 17-17-3(11) (2013), Idaho Code § 19-
5304(1)(e) (2017), Ind. Code § 35-40-13-2 (Supp. 1999 & 2004), Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 74-7333 (West 1989), Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.500 
(West 2013), La. Stat. Ann. § 46:1842 (2010), Miss. Code Ann. § 99-
43-3 (172), Mo. Ann. Stat. § 595.200 (West 1986), Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 46-24-106 (2001), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-119 (2016), Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 176.015 (2017), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-M:8-k (1955 & supp. 2018), 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-830 (2017), Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2930.02 
(West 1999), Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 142.3 (supp. 1985 & 2018), Or. 
Const. art. 1 § 42; 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 11.103 (West 
1998), S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1510 (2003), S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-
28C-4 (2004 & supp. 2010), Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-203 (2014 & supp. 
VIIC 2018), Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 56.01 (West 2013), Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (West 1994), Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-11.01 (2015 
& supp. 2018), Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.69.020 (LexisNexis 2017), 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-101 (2017). 
62. David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer 
the “Forgotten Victim,” 17 Pepp. L. Rev. 35, 50 (1989). 
63. Id. at 51. 
64. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987). 
65. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
66. Id. at 497–98. 
67. Id. at 498–99. 
68. Id. at 499. 
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how the Bronsteins’ granddaughter had sought counseling but 
eventually quit because “no one could help her,” and the Bronsteins’ 
daughter added that she could not forgive the murderers and that “such 
a person could ‘[n]ever be rehabilitated.’”69 The defense counsel moved 
to suppress the VIS, arguing that it was “irrelevant and unduly 
inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital case violated the 
Eighth Amendment.”70 The Court noted that the VIS in this case 
contained two types of information for the jury: (1) “the personal 
characteristics of the victims and the emotional impact of the crimes 
on the family,”71 and (2) the family’s “opinions and characterizations of 
the crimes and the defendant.”72 As for the first category of VIS, the 
Court agreed with the defense that descriptions of the harm to the 
family and the characteristics of the victim were irrelevant in a capital 
sentencing hearing. Citing their decision in Woodson, the Court 
reiterated that when deciding whether or not to impose the death 
penalty, “the jury is required to focus on the defendant as a ‘uniquely 
individual human bein[g].’”73 By allowing a VIS of this type to be 
considered at sentencing, the Court was afraid that the focus would 
turn from the defendant to the victim’s character and the emotional 
consequences that the crime had on the victim’s family.74 Additionally, 
by allowing these characterizations of the victim, the Court was 
concerned that once the defendant had a chance to rebut this evidence, 
the sentencing may turn into a “mini trial” on the victim’s character, 
which could distract the jury from their ultimate sentencing goals—
“determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of the 
background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances 
of the crime.”75 Turning to the second category of VIS offered in the 
case, the Court concluded that this type of information “can serve no 
other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the 
case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant.”76 
Despite breaking down the VIS into two distinct categories, the Court 
ultimately held that the introduction of any VIS at the sentencing phase 
of a capital murder trial was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.77 
 
69. Id. at 500 (citation omitted). 
70. Id. at 500–01. 
71. Id. at 502.  
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 504 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 507. 
76. Id. at 508. 
77. Id. at 509. 
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The Court affirmed this ruling in South Carolina v. Gathers,78 
holding that a prosecutor’s comments on the personal qualities of a 
victim, which the prosecutor inferred from a religious tract and a voter 
registration card that were in the victim’s possession, and “[a]llowing 
the jury to rely on [this information] . . . could result in imposing the 
death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was 
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill.”79 
Two years later, in Payne v. Tennessee,80 the Court clarified 
whether Booth and Gathers barred all VISs in all situations in capital 
cases. In Payne, the accused was convicted of the first-degree murders 
of Charisse Christopher and her two-year-old daughter, Lacie, and of 
first-degree assault with intent to murder against Charisse’s three-year-
old son, Nicholas, who survived the brutal knife attack on the family.81 
Against the rulings in Booth and Gathers, the State called Nicholas’s 
grandmother during sentencing, who testified how much Nicholas 
missed his mother and his baby sister.82 Additionally, the prosecutor, 
while arguing for the death penalty, commented on the continuing 
effects that Nicholas experienced from the attack and on the effects of 
the crimes upon the victims’ family.83 The Court overruled Gathers and 
Booth in part, holding that the Eighth Amendment does not create a 
per se ban on the introduction of a VIS during the sentencing phase in 
a capital case.84 Insofar as the overturning the holding in Booth, the 
Court specified that this ruling overturned the inadmissibility of the 
first category of VIS distinguished in the case—the “evidence and 
argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim’s death 
on the victim’s family,” but noted that no evidence relating to the 
second category of VIS was introduced in this case, thus Booth 
continued to hold that “the admission of a victim’s family members’ 
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the 
appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.”85 
 
78. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
79. Id. at 808–11 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)). The 
Gathers Court extended Booth’s prohibition on victim impact evidence to 
comments made by a prosecutor, but the Court subsequently rejected and 
overturned this view in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826–27 (1991). 
80. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
81. Id. at 811–12. 
82. Id. at 814–16. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 827, 830. 
85. Id. at 830 n.2. 
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In 2016, the Supreme Court further explained the relationship 
between Payne and Booth in Bosse v. Oklahoma.86 A jury convicted 
Bosse of three counts of first-degree murder.87 Bosse was sentenced to 
death after the State requested that three of the victim’s family 
members recommend a sentence for the jury, and all three relatives 
recommended death.88 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held 
that Payne “implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regarding 
characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the sentence.”89 The 
Supreme Court reiterated that “[courts] remain[] bound by Booth’s 
prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family 
members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence 
unless this Court reconsiders that ban.”90 
III. Problems Left from the Ban on Victims’ Family 
Members’ Characterizations and Opinions About the 
Crime 
A. Do All Admissions of These Types of VISs Violate the Eighth 
Amendment? 
Currently, Booth is still good law as far as the “prohibition on 
characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members about 
the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.”91 The Court 
rationalized this bar by stating that the presentation of this information 
“can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from 
deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the 
defendant,” and would therefore violate the Eighth Amendment.92  
What the ruling in Booth fails to consider, though, is what should 
happen in the cases in which the victim’s family requests that the 
accused should be spared the death penalty. The introduction of this 
type of VIS (an Opposition VIS) is currently still prohibited by Booth, 
but the prohibition is not justified in this case by the Court’s fear of 
inflaming the jury when deciding whether or not to impose the death 
penalty. Certainly, statements from a victim’s family requesting the 
death penalty could fall within the justification of the prohibition. In 
Booth, the relevant VIS included during sentencing were from the 
victims’ daughter and son, with their son saying that the petitioner  
86. 137 S. Ct. 1 (2016) (per curiam). 
87. Id. at 2. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. (quoting Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 920 (1997)). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508–09 (1987). 
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should not get away with this crime and their daughter saying that she 
did not feel as if the petitioner could ever be rehabilitated.93  
These VISs no doubt violate the Eighth Amendment. As Justice 
Marshall stated in Furman, “the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted 
to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance.”94 
A vengeful opinion like the one presented in Booth from those impacted 
by a crime would likely have no insight as to whether or not the 
convicted could be rehabilitated, and this type of statement would only 
serve to inflame the jury and potentially sway jurors towards a harsher 
punishment based on emotion alone. As the Court stated in Booth, “the 
admission of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions 
the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the 
reasoned decision-making we require in capital cases.”95 A passionate 
plea from a victim’s family member to impose the death penalty would 
run the risk of the jury making their determination based on emotion 
rather than based on reason, which is exactly the contrary of what 
Booth requires.96 But the Court also held that VISs encouraging the 
jury not to impose the death penalty because of either the victim’s or 
her family’s opposition to the death penalty is the same kind of 
“emotionally charged opinion” disallowed under Booth.97 
Additionally, a victim’s family convincing the jury that the victim 
was a better person than the “average victim” should not result in a 
harsher punishment than would be imposed for the murder of said 
“average victim.” The Court in Payne made clear, though, that “victim 
impact evidence is not offered to encourage comparative judgments of 
this kind—for instance, that the killer of a hardworking, devoted parent 
deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate does 
not.”98 
B. A Prohibition on Opposition VISs is Inconsistent with the Ideals of 
Furman 
In Furman, States argued in favor of the imposition of the death 
penalty by reasoning that “[t]he infliction of death . . . serves to 
manifest the community’s outrage at the commission of the crime.”99 
Without the admission of a VIS from a victim’s family requesting that 
the accused should be spared his life, the imposition of the death 
 
93. Id. at 508. 
94. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
95. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508–09. 
96. Id. at 508. 
97. See id. at 508–09.  
98. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991). 
99. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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penalty may do the exact opposite. Allowing the death penalty to be 
imposed when the victim’s family holds the contrary opinion would 
allow the State to enforce “the ultimate sanction” beyond the scope of 
the original intent of the punishment.100  
Although the Furman Court’s concern was the arbitrary and 
discriminatory imposition of the death penalty, Justice White stated 
that “the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries” was 
“a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of 
the law and to bring community judgment to bear on the 
sentence . . . .”101 A likely reason why the Court was concerned with 
mitigating the harshness of the law is reflected in the reoccurring theme 
that death is different.102 Justice Brennan added the notion that when 
a person is executed, “[it] is a way of saying, ‘You are not fit for this 
world, take your chance elsewhere.’”103 If the decision to impose the 
death sentence is vested in the jury truly to mitigate this kind of verdict 
using the judgment of the community, it follows that evidence of the 
community, and especially the victim herself, wishing for peace for the 
accused and the opposition of death should be admissible for the jury 
to make their determination. 
Such evidence may have made a difference in Daniel Pitcher’s case. 
There, the jury may have used the loss of Sister Joanne Marie—“a 
woman of justice, a woman of peace”104—to justify taking Pitcher’s life. 
But if the jury had heard the opinions of the Sisters against the death 
penalty at sentencing, the jury may have viewed their decision in a 
different way: their sentence would simply mirror Pitcher’s crime. 
Through the death penalty, the jury would be taking another person’s 
life in the name of the crime’s justice-seeking, peaceful victim. In this 
circumstance, an Opposition VIS being admissible at sentencing could 
have had an effect on the jurors while making their decision; although, 
as a result of the jury’s confusion, Pitcher did not receive the death 
penalty even though the jury intended to impose it.105 In other cases, 
though, a real difference may have been made if the victims and victims’ 
family members were allowed to present their opinions to the jury that 
they did not want, or the victim would not have wanted, the death 
penalty. 
 
100. Id. at 286. 
101. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
102. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
103. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
104. Friends Seek Meaning, supra note 6. 
105. See supra Introduction. 
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C. Motivations of the Prosecutors 
In criminal cases, the State acts in the name of the victim in order 
to avoid revenge and achieve a fair punishment.106 At trial, though, the 
State is represented by an individual—a prosecutor “whose 
interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done.”107 At the same time, a prosecutor balances 
his personal interests, such as winning an election or reelection for his 
position.108 Although a violation of a prosecutor’s ethical standards,109 
in many instances, a prosecutor’s motivation to pursue the death 
penalty is at least in part a political one.110 In Payne, the Court stated, 
“As a general matter . . . victim impact evidence is not offered to 
encourage comparative judgments . . . for instance, that the killer of a 
hardworking, devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the 
murderer of a reprobate does not.”111 But occasionally, this same 
reasoning is what motivates a prosecutor to decide whether or not to 
seek the death penalty.112 
It is not inconceivable, for instance, that the prosecutor’s decision 
to pursue the death penalty in Pitcher’s case was especially influenced 
 
106. Logan, Through the Past, supra note 59, at 143. 
107. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
108. Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death 
Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’ Campaigning on Capital 
Convictions, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 941, 946 (1994). 
109. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution Function § 3-1.6 (4th ed. 2015) (“A prosecutor should not 
use other improper considerations, such as partisan or political or personal 
considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion.”); id. at § 3-1.7(f) 
(“The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s professional judgment 
or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s . . . political . . . or other 
interests or relationships.”). 
110. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 12, at 1161 (“[The prosecutors] gave us an 
article about death penalty politics and how prosecutors across the 
country are being elected and rejected based on their stance on capital 
punishment.”); Thomas Johnson, Death Penalty on Trial: When 
Prosecutors Seek the Death Penalty, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 245, 280 (1994) 
(“The decision [for a prosecutor to seek the death penalty] will be a 
political one, or it will have a political context which may be dictated by 
promises the prosecutor made during an election campaign or by previous 
cases.”). 
111. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991). 
112. See Johnson, supra note 110, at 280 (stating that the media’s coverage of 
a case will have a “critical impact” on whether or not a prosecutor decides 
to seek the death penalty). “Significant media attention given to the 
murder of a young child of an affluent White family will trigger a very 
different reaction from a prosecutor than a case that gets little media 
attention and involves a victim from a poorer community.” Id. 
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by the fact that Sister Joanne Marie was a nun. If this were the case, 
one way to combat the idea that a nun’s murderer deserves the death 
penalty over a murderer of anyone else would be for the Sisters 
themselves to be able to state their opinions that they, and Sister 
Joanne Marie, believe the exact opposite.113 In circumstances where the 
prosecutor is pressured politically and by the media to consider cases 
this way, perhaps the only way to avoid the “comparative judgments” 
that the media seems to instinctively make is to introduce the type of 
VIS that Payne and Bosse left untouched.114 
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Booth, opposed the 
prohibition of all VISs because it did not make sense to allow only those 
on one side of the issue to be heard: 
To require, as we have, that all mitigating factors which render 
capital punishment a harsh penalty in the particular case be 
placed before the sentencing authority, while simultaneously 
requiring, as we do today, that evidence of much of the human 
suffering the defendant has inflicted be suppressed, is in effect to 
prescribe a debate on the appropriateness of the capital penalty 
with one side muted. If that penalty is constitutional, as we have 
repeatedly said it is, it seems to me not remotely unconstitutional 
to permit both the pros and the cons in the particular case to be 
heard.115 
Following this line of thinking, a prohibition on Opposition VISs 
fails the victim in a capital case. Although in a criminal case the State 
acts in the name of a victim, the interests represented are to be those 
of the State.116 By prohibiting an Opposition VIS, the victim’s point of 
view is “muted” not against the defendant’s, but against the 
prosecutor’s. While the goal of our criminal justice system is for “justice 
[to] be done,”117 that goal is hindered by the political motivations of a 
prosecutor in deciding to seek the death penalty. While admitting an 
Opposition VIS at sentencing would not cure the defects in the 
 
113. See supra Introduction. While it is not uncommon for prosecutors to 
consult with families of victims when determining whether or not to 
pursue the death penalty, in such situations where the prosecutor is 
pressured to seek the death penalty and the victim’s family opposes death, 
the majority of prosecutors reject the family’s conflicting viewpoint in 
making the ultimate decision. Wayne A. Logan, Victims, Survivors, and 
the Decision to Seek and Impose Death, in Wounds That Do Not Bind: 
Victim-Based Perspectives on the Death Penalty 161, 171 n.8 and 
accompanying text (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006). 
114. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.  
115. Booth v. Maryland, 428 U.S. 496, 520–21 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
116. See supra notes 106 and accompanying text. 
117. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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relationship between a prosecutor’s representation of the State’s 
interests and political and media pressures, it would aid the ultimate 
goal of justice by balancing any underlying political pressures to pursue 
the death penalty against the opinions of those who were directly 
affected by the crime—the victim’s family. 
IV. Fixing the Problems Left by Booth, Payne, and 
Bosse 
A. Proposed Solution 
The problems left behind by the Booth–Payne–Bosse prohibition 
on “characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members 
about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence”118 could 
be solved by the Court adopting an asymmetrical approach that creates 
two distinct categories for VISs that support the death penalty and 
those that oppose it (“Support VISs” and “Opposition VISs,” 
respectively). The Court should create a rule that allows Opposition 
VISs to be introduced at sentencing yet still bans the use of Support 
VISs. Allowing this testimony at sentencing would not violate the 
Eighth Amendment, because, if anything, the evidence would encourage 
the exact opposite of “cruel and unusual punishment[],”119 would 
support the central theme that has been repeated throughout many of 
the Court’s death penalty decisions that death is a fundamentally 
different punishment,120 and could counter underlying political pressures 
motivating a prosecutor to pursue the death penalty by letting the 
victim’s family be heard.121 Regarding cases in which a prosecutor feels 
political or media pressure to pursue the death penalty in a case where 
they otherwise may not, a rule similar to this one would protect against 
a determination that one person deserves the death penalty for the 
exact same crime as another, simply because of who the victim was and 
how much the media cares about her death.122 
Opposition VISs could also be introduced at sentencing if the Court 
reconsidered the definition of “mitigating circumstances” addressed in 
Lockett, expanding that definition to include these types of statements. 
Lockett requires that the sentencing authority in a capital case “not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
 
118. Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam). 
119. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see discussion supra Section III.A. 
120. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
121. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
122. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
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death.”123 A plain reading of the holding could include Opposition VISs 
as “any circumstance of the offense” if they were offered by the 
defendant during sentencing, though subsequent case law has 
interpreted this requirement more narrowly.124 Although VISs in general 
usually do not provide any type of insight relevant to the defendant’s 
culpability, allowing Opposition VISs on behalf of the defendant would 
allow the victim’s family’s opinions to be considered as a mitigating 
factor to be balanced against any aggravating factors, and it would still 
remain up to the sentencing authority to determine how much weight 
to give the Opposition VIS.125 
B. Criticisms of the Proposed Rule 
i. Fairness to Those in Support of the Death Penalty 
Critics of the proposed rule to allow Opposition VISs may argue 
that, on its face, the rule still does not allow all victims’ families to be 
heard.126 While a family’s opinion against the death penalty would be 
admissible, one requesting the death penalty would remain prohibited. 
An asymmetrical rule like this one, though, can be justified by the fact 
that one of these opinions still violates the Eighth Amendment, while 
an Opposition VIS does not.127 The rule gains more support because it 
follows the ideals of Furman and the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
death penalty since the Furman decision, that death is different, and 
an asymmetrical rule like this would further this moral by continuing 
to limit the number of defendants who are sentenced to death.128 
Additionally, this rule is not as fundamentally unfair as it first 
appears because in a capital case where a victim’s family supports the 
death penalty, their position is already being advocated for by the 
 
123. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
124. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (recognizing that all 
mitigating factors must be considered so that the sentencer could focus 
“on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime”) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976)). “‘Mitigating circumstances’ 
are such as do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in 
question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as 
extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.” Mitigating 
Circumstances, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910). 
125. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114–15 (“The sentencer . . . may determine the 
weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence.”). 
126. See Logan, supra note 113, at 172 (arguing that an asymmetrical rule 
values the view of some survivors (or in this case, family members) over 
others and ignores the wishes of those most directly affected by a crime 
only when it suits its own purpose). 
127. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
128. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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prosecutor.129 In this situation, there is already someone who is speaking 
not explicitly for those who support it, but with them. By allowing an 
Opposition VIS, in instances where there are multiple victims or family 
members with different opinions, while those supporting the death 
penalty’s position is being advocated by the prosecutor, those opposing 
the death penalty can make their differing opinions heard to the 
sentencer as well. 
In multiple-homicide cases, for instance, there may even be differing 
opinions amongst the various victims’ families. In January 2017, Dylann 
Roof was sentenced to death after the racially motivated murders of 
nine African-Americans in their church in Charleston, South 
Carolina.130 The brother of Cynthia Hurd, one of Roof’s victims, stated 
that he was satisfied with the death penalty decision, saying: “How do 
you justify saving one life when you took nine, and in such a brutal 
fashion?”131 Although justice seemed to be served in the eyes of one of 
those impacted most by the killings, this was not the consensual 
viewpoint of all of the victims’ family members.132 Esther Lance, 
daughter of victim Ethel Lee Lance, admitted that she wanted Roof to 
die at first, but changed her mind after realizing that it was not what 
her mother would have wanted.133 Esther was certainly not the first 
loved one of a murder victim that opposed the death penalty for the 
murderer.134 
 
129. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
130. Alan Binder & Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof Is Sentenced to Death in 
Charleston Church Massacre, N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/dylann-roof-trial-charleston.html [https:// 
perma.cc/89FV-9BYT]. 
131. Id. 
132. Eliott C. McLaughlin, They May Not Forgive Dylann Roof, But They 
Don’t Want Him Dead, CNN (Jan. 12, 2017, 5:03 PM), http://www.cnn. 
com/2017/01/12/us/dylann-roof-victims-oppose-death-penalty/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9JZB-R9JB]. 
133. Id. 
134. See, e.g., Tammy Vigil, Families of Murder Victims Rally Against Death 
Penalty, KDVR (Jan. 8, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://kdvr.com/2014/01/08/ 
families-of-murder-victims-rally-against-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/ 
DE65-6PG6] (detailing three families protesting together against the 
death penalty for the murderers of their loved ones); Families of Murder 
Victims Speak out Against the Death Penalty, ACLU Northern Cal., 
https://www.aclunc.org/article/families-murder-victims-speak-out-against-
death-penalty [https://perma.cc/H8SV-5KZV] (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) 
(describing murder victims’ families coming together to form a publication 
entitled “Voices from California Crime Victims for Alternatives to the 
Death Penalty”); Nicole Flatow, Why These Victims’ Parents Don’t Want 
the Death Penalty for the Boston Bomber, ThinkProgress (Apr. 17, 
2015, 5:41 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/why-these-victims-parents-don-
t-want-the-death-penalty-for-the-boston-bomber-c2e66f153092/ [https:// 
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ii. The State Is the Other Party in a Criminal Case, Not the Victim 
Another potential criticism of the proposed rule is that in criminal 
cases, the State is the party that brings suit against the defendant on 
behalf of the victim; it is not itself a victim. Thus, a VIS opposing the 
death penalty could undermine the prosecutor’s determination of the 
appropriate sentence. Although the State is the other party, it is not 
the State’s life that was taken, nor, in most cases, does the State have 
to live with the emotional consequences. Since the victim’s life was 
taken and the victim’s families are the ones who must deal with the 
emotional aftermath, it makes sense that, in cases not motivated by 
revenge or hatred, the victims and their families should have their 
opinions heard about what happens to a person that committed a crime 
against them, especially when factoring in the point that many times 
the prosecutor’s decision to pursue the death penalty has been 
influenced by political and media pressures.135 Although the victim is 
not the defendant in the party, the law has recognized the right for 
victims to be heard and most of the time that right extends to family 
members in death penalty cases.136 
iii. Would Allowing Opposition VISs Risk the Arbitrary Sentencing 
that Furman Prohibits? 
Allowing Opposition VISs to be considered at sentencing 
potentially raises the same risk that the Court in Furman guarded 
against: allowing a sentencer to decide whether or not to impose the 
death penalty based on matters other than the evidence.137 But this 
concern is based on too broad an interpretation of the Court’s holding 
in Furman. In Furman, Justice Douglas indicated that the death 
penalty would violate the Eighth Amendment as being “‘unusual’ if it 
discriminates against [a defendant] by reason of his race, religion, 
wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure 
that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”138 He continued by 
stating that the death penalty statutes at issue were unconstitutional 
 
perma.cc/6CCL-FL3L]; Some Oklahoma City Bombing Families Fight for 
McVeigh’s Life, CNN (May 4, 2001, 11:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2001/ 
US/05/04/mcveigh.families/index.html [https://perma.cc/X8UG-4MJA]. 
135. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
136. See Logan, supra note 59, at 153–54. 
137. See Logan, supra note 113, at 169. 
138. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
see also id. at 364–66 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that statistics at 
the time of the decision showed evidence of racial discrimination in 
executions, along with disproportionate imposition of the death penalty 
for men, the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of 
society). 
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because “no standards govern[ed] the selection of the penalty. People 
live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.”139 The 
arbitrariness at issue in Furman related to the potential of 
discrimination. This is further supported by the holdings in Lockett and 
Eddings, requiring that sentencers take into consideration “as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.”140 That type of individualized 
sentencing determination, combined with the Court’s continual 
limitations on the death penalty’s application, demonstrates the Court’s 
recognition that death is an inherently different kind of punishment 
than other criminal punishments. As such, all relevant factors should 
be considered as to whether death is an appropriate punishment in each 
particular case.  
iv. Motivations for Opposing the Death Penalty 
A final criticism is the fact that some VIS that oppose the death 
penalty may be simply for the fact that the family members want their 
loved one’s killer to have to think about what he did and not get the 
“easy way out.” Although there has been long-standing debate about 
whether life in prison or capital punishment is a more severe sanction, 
the Court has continually held that death is the ultimate punishment.141 
If a victim’s family requests a sentence lesser than death, with the 
intention that this is the more severe sentence, then there is no violation 
of the Eighth Amendment because of the Court’s holding that life in 
prison is not a crueler punishment than the death penalty.142 
 
139. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
140. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
141. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 345–46 (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing his 
view that death is “the ultimate sanction”). 
142. See id. at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The unusual severity of death 
is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in these 
respects, is in a class by itself.”). Justice Brennan later compares the death 
penalty with a life prison sentence, noting: 
The contrast [of the death penalty] with the plight of a person 
punished by imprisonment is evident. An individual in prison does 
not lose “the right to have rights.” A prisoner retains, for example, 
the constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, to be free 
of cruel and unusual punishments, and to treatment as a “person” 
for purposes of due process of law and the equal protection of the 
laws . . . . His punishment is not irrevocable . . . . An executed 
person has indeed “lost the right to have rights.” 
 Id. at 290. 
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V. Conclusion 
States have ordinarily considered their own interests when deciding 
whether to seek the death penalty. Because of the holdings in Booth, 
Payne, and Bosse, though, the family members of victims in many 
circumstances have no legal way of expressing to the jury any reasons 
why they would not want the death penalty to be implemented. In this 
situation, the State’s motivations are the only thing considered, and 
those who were impacted most by the crime and have to continue to 
live with the aftermath are not given a chance to share their opinions 
on what should happen to the person who changed their lives so 
drastically. By reconsidering the question of Opposition VIS 
admissibility in capital sentencing, the Court should create a rule 
allowing those who could submit Opposition VISs do so for the jury’s 
consideration. The rule need not be one barring the possibility of the 
death penalty if the family members do not want it but simply one that 
allows for a statement for the jury to take into account in their 
sentencing determination. Although it may seem one-sided that a 
victim’s family would potentially only be able to be heard if they did 
not support the death penalty, and not those who did, those supporting 
the death penalty have their position advocated for by the prosecutor. 
As many prosecutors are influenced by outside political and media 
pressures to seek the death penalty, an asymmetrical rule allowing 
Opposition VISs would not solve this problem but could potentially 
counterbalance the effects. The most support for the proposed rule 
comes from the Supreme Court themselves, mentioned in Furman and 
in numerous cases since then, that death is a fundamentally different 
punishment and should be treated as such.143 
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